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PINPOINT REDISTRICTING AND THE MINIMIZATION OF
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING†
ABSTRACT
For over twenty years, the political gerrymandering claim under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been mired in ambiguity
because the Supreme Court and lower courts have failed to come up with a
clear standard to determine whether a redistricting plan is unconstitutional.
In 2006, however, a new phenomenon that this Comment terms “pinpoint
redistricting” was used by Georgia’s Republican-dominated state legislature
to alter the boundaries of a small group of districts rather than all of the
state’s district boundaries, severely weakening the strength of Democratic
voters in the affected districts. The pinpoint redistricting changed the affected
districts from competitive to strongly Republican, and as a result, the
redistricting party’s candidates achieved sizable victories in the 2006
elections.
In the context of this novel form of redistricting, this Comment proposes a
new approach to the political gerrymandering claim. All of the Supreme
Court’s previous cases examined political gerrymanders that redrew all of a
state’s boundaries and addressed the harm to political groups in statewide
terms. Pinpoint redistricting’s effect on a limited number of districts should
allow courts to shift to a district-based approach to judge these gerrymanders.
Such an approach would be tailored to the facts of pinpoint redistricting,
drawing from Justice Stevens’s proposal to adapt the Court’s racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence from the Shaw v. Reno line of cases to the
political gerrymandering claim, elements of the original political
gerrymandering standard from Davis v. Bandemer, and Justice Kennedy’s
elusive view on what would be an applicable standard for certain narrowly
defined situations.
Under this new standard, an extreme political
gerrymander, identifiable by the unusual nature of its implementation, would
be unconstitutional if partisan intent guided every major aspect of drawing the
new district lines and resulted in active degradation of a political group’s
electoral strength in a specific district through substantial weakening of the
†

This Comment received the 2008 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.

WHITMAN GALLEYSFINAL

212

10/30/2009 3:11:55 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

group’s political performance in successive elections. While this standard is
designed to correct the danger of pinpoint redistricting, it can serve as a model
for an effective district-based approach to future political gerrymandering
claims.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, partisan gerrymandering has made competitive
legislative elections a rarity.1 Only a small fraction of seats have seen
meaningful competition in recent elections; the vast majority of elections are
decided the day the district maps are drawn.2 Partisan gerrymanders, drawn to
perfection by state legislators, provide a major advantage to the party
controlling the redistricting process as opposition party politicians find
themselves running in districts where they could not possibly win,3 and
friendly incumbents run for reelection in impregnable districts.4 Across the
political spectrum, observers criticize the practice of partisan gerrymandering
as a major threat to American democracy,5 allowing those who draw the
district lines to control the electoral system rather than the people themselves.6
1 See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest
Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 179 (2003) (calling the round of redistricting
after the 2000 census “the most incumbent-friendly in modern American history”). In 2006, only 55 out of
435 House races were considered competitive. Ronald A. Klain, Success Changes Nothing: The 2006 Election
Results and the Undiminished Need for a Progressive Response to Political Gerrymandering, 1 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 75, 81 (2007).
2 See David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of Redistricting
on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L. J. 144, 157 (2006) (observing “an overall pattern
indicating that partisan gerrymandering . . . has a dampening effect on competition”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Kennedy Court: OCTOBER TERM 2005, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 335, 343 (2006) (noting that there are few legislative
races that are even contested due to gerrymandering).
3 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat to
Democracy?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63 (describing how a Republican-engineered partisan
gerrymander in Texas essentially doomed the reelection chances of several veteran Democratic congressmen).
4 See Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
443, 446 (2005) (“Incumbents rig their re-election prospects by packing their own districts with friendly
voters, which scares off or trounces challengers attempting to take their seats.”).
5 See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What Is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY LINES:
COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 92, 92 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain
eds., 2005) (calling the impact of gerrymandering on recent elections a threat to the “legitimacy of the
American electoral system” and accusing partisanship in the redistricting process of causing serious problems
in American democracy); see generally David S. Broder, No Vote Necessary: Redistricting Is Creating a U.S.
House of Lords, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at A37 (discussing how gerrymandering harms the representative
nature of the House of Representatives).
6 As Justice Stevens wrote, through partisan gerrymanders, “the will of the cartographers rather than the
will of the people will govern.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Despite the widespread harmful effects of partisan gerrymandering, the
Supreme Court’s attempts to restrain excessive partisanship can only be
described as impotent.7 Since establishing the political gerrymandering claim
in Davis v. Bandemer in 1986,8 the Court has maintained the option of striking
down a partisan gerrymander, but it has never exercised that option or even
articulated a clear standard to guide courts and litigants.9 The culmination of
the Court’s inaction came in the 2006 LULAC v. Perry decision, when the
Court declined to strike down an unprecedented and egregiously partisan middecade redistricting in Texas.10 This unfortunate demonstration of the Court’s
unwillingness to intervene opened the door to more frequent and even more
partisan gerrymanders.11
A more subtle incident in 2006, however, marked a crucial development in
the history of partisan gerrymandering and has the potential to revolutionize
the judicial approach to this troubled constitutional claim. Georgia’s Senate
District 46 was a rare competitive seat in a mostly Republican state;12 the 2004
election was decided by about 1,800 votes out of over 47,000 cast.13 The
Republican incumbent had announced he would not run for reelection in 2006,
and popular Democratic State Representative Jane Kidd announced her
candidacy for the open seat.14 Before the 2006 election, however,15 the
Republican-dominated state legislature of Georgia implemented what this
7 See Nathaniel Persily, Forty Years in the Political Thicket: Judicial Review of the Redistricting
Process Since Reynolds v. Sims, in PARTY LINES, supra note 5, at 67, 78 (calling the political gerrymandering
claim “toothless”).
8 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119–27 (1986) (determining that political gerrymandering
claims are justiciable).
9 As one court colorfully put it, “The law regarding political gerrymandering is about as firm as
marshmallow cream.” LaPorte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the County of LaPorte,
851 F. Supp. 340, 342 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
10 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006) (declining to
strike down the Texas mid-decade redistricting as unconstitutional); Mitchell N. Berman, Managing
Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 845–47 (2005) (discussing the “unprecedented” Texas mid-decade
redistricting and noting that its partisan motivation was “both extreme and avowed”); Pamela S. Karlan, New
Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 756 (2007) (calling the Texas
mid-decade redistricting “both procedurally and geographically an ugly piece of work”).
11 Persily, supra note 7, at 80.
12 See Allison Floyd, Athens Democrat Jane Kidd to Seek State Senate Seat; Brian Kemp Wants to Be
Agriculture Commissioner; He’ll Give Up Senate Post, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 21, 2005, at B2 (calling
District 46 “up for grabs” and “politically balanced”).
13 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006).
14 Floyd, supra note 12, at B2.
15 Kidd announced her candidacy in May 2005. Id. The pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 was
signed into law in March 2006. Walter C. Jones, Perdue OKs Split of Athens Districts; Democrats Claim the
Remap Is a Ploy to Help Republican Candidates, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Mar. 3, 2006, at B5.
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Comment calls a “pinpoint redistricting,” a new form of partisan
gerrymandering that alters an isolated group of districts rather than the entire
state map. The Georgia state legislature’s partisan gerrymander affected only
District 46 and two of its neighboring districts.16
While political
gerrymandering has had a major impact on state and national politics for
centuries,17 an isolated gerrymander tailored to affect a political party or
candidate in a single district was a new phenomenon. Every previously
adjudicated political gerrymandering claim, including all of the Supreme
Court’s prior decisions, addressed a traditional redistricting plan that redrew all
of a state’s districts.18 The Georgia state legislature minimized the partisan
gerrymander to change the political character of a single competitive seat.19
The pinpoint redistricting was successful—in a race where Kidd had a good
chance to win before the alteration of the district,20 she lost to the Republican
candidate by a double-digit margin.21
Pinpoint redistricting represents a serious threat to what little
competitiveness remains in legislative elections22 because it allows partisan
actors to thwart any threat to their control of individual seats at any time
without the attention or accountability to an entire state’s voters, which a
statewide gerrymander would have. Despite its devastating potential, however,
this new form of partisan gerrymandering is ultimately an opportunity for
courts to develop an effective political gerrymandering standard. For over
twenty years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have addressed political
16

Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *8.
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274–75 (2004) (noting that “[p]olitical gerrymanders are not new
to the American scene” and discussing the history of gerrymandering stretching back to the founding days of
our nation); see also DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 17–40 (1992) (tracing the long and controversial history of redistricting practices
in the United States from the 1790s to the 1990s); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 3 (2002) (attributing
the origins of the term “gerrymander” to Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry’s manipulation of districts in
the early 1800s).
18 See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (judging a
statewide Texas plan); Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (judging a statewide Pennsylvania plan); Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986) (judging a statewide Indiana plan); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(judging a statewide bipartisan gerrymander in Connecticut).
19 See Walter C. Jones, GOP Might Miss Power to Remap, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 5, 2006, at B1
(observing that the “new lines put a more Republican tilt to District 46”).
20 Floyd, supra note 12, at B2.
21 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 7,
2006 General Election (Nov. 16, 2006), http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2006_1107/075.htm
(showing election results from State Senate, District 46).
22 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
17
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gerrymandering by looking at the statewide impact of a redistricting plan, but
using this approach, they have failed to establish a clear or meaningful
standard.23 Pinpoint redistricting, however, only affects distinct and isolated
districts rather than the entire state. Therefore, courts should formulate a new,
district-based standard based on the factual scenario of pinpoint redistricting,
which can then serve as a model for an effective, judicially manageable
standard for all political gerrymandering claims. With the round of
redistricting following the 2010 census fast approaching, a clear, relevant, and
innovative approach to modern pinpoint partisan gerrymanders is necessary to
stem the tide of excessive partisan abuses in drawing district lines.
Part I of this Comment traces the development of the political
gerrymandering claim and describes the changing nature of political
gerrymandering with the appearance of mid-decade redistricting in the 2000s.
Part II describes the first appearance of pinpoint redistricting in Georgia and its
likely use elsewhere in the future. Part III discusses why the traditional
statewide approach to adjudicating political gerrymandering claims should not
apply to pinpoint redistricting and argues that a new, district-based standard is
needed to address pinpoint redistricting effectively. Part IV draws upon
existing sources, including a modification of the framework of Davis v.
Bandemer and an adaptation of the Shaw v. Reno line of cases to partisan
gerrymandering, to formulate a district-based standard. It ultimately proposes
a new standard for political gerrymandering claims based on the facts of
pinpoint redistricting and addresses discrimination in an individual district.
This new approach can provide a template for an effective district-based
standard for all future political gerrymandering claims.
I. BROAD FOUNDATIONS: THE TRADITIONAL STATEWIDE APPROACH TO
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
Political gerrymandering is the manipulation of electoral districts by
elected officials to give the redistricting party an unfair advantage over the
opposition party.24 This is done by deliberately drawing districts to dilute the
23 See Aaron Brooks, The Court’s Missed Opportunity to Draw the Line on Partisan Gerrymandering:
LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 781, 781–82 (2007) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s failure to establish a standard in three different cases).
24 COX & KATZ, supra note 17, at 18. One of the earliest judicial definitions of political gerrymandering
was provided by Justice Fortas: “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes.” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
Justice Scalia, taking his definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, defined political
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power of the opposing party, often by grouping a large number of members of
one political party into a small number of districts to limit their victories
(known as “packing”) or spreading a political party’s members across a
number of districts to deny them a chance of winning in as many districts as
possible (known as “cracking”).25 In the landmark 1964 decision of Reynolds
v. Sims, the Supreme Court established the “one-person, one-vote” standard,
which prescribes that, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, all legislative districts are required to represent approximately
equal numbers of people to ensure that each person’s vote has equal value.26
Reynolds required all state legislatures to redraw congressional and state
legislative districts’ boundaries upon the release of new census numbers at the
beginning of each decade.27 During this “Reapportionment Revolution,”28
however, state legislators controlling the redistricting process inevitably
injected partisan and personal political goals into drawing new district
boundaries,29 resulting in partisan gerrymanders heavily skewed in favor of the
party that created the plan.30
Partisan gerrymandering was criticized for decades after Reynolds,31 but the
round of redistricting after the 2000 census truly demonstrated its detrimental
influence on American legislative elections.32 As the partisan bent of the postgerrymandering as “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly
irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999)).
25 Michael D. McDonald & Richard L. Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 178, 178–79 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990).
26 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 561–63 (1964). Reynolds showed that if one district contained
far fewer voters than another, the votes of individuals in the first district would be more meaningful than the
votes of individuals in a more populous district. The Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause, each
person’s vote must count equally, and therefore districts should have equal populations. Id.
27 See Richard L. Engstrom, The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights, in FAIR
AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 7 (Mark E. Rush
& Richard L. Engstrom eds., 2001) (“New census figures almost always reveal that districts no longer satisfy
this [one-person, one-vote] requirement and therefore need to be rearranged.”).
28 COX & KATZ, supra note 17, at 12.
29 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“Politics and political considerations are
inseparable from districting and apportionment.”).
30 See COX & KATZ, supra note 17, at 18–19 (describing partisan gerrymanders after Reynolds that
“maximize[d] the gain of the redistricting party”).
31 See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 17, at 36–39 (discussing the controversy associated with the role of
partisanship in redistricting in the 1970s and 1980s); McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 25, at 178 (calling
gerrymandering “a noxious political practice”).
32 See Mann, supra note 5, at 92 (citing the post-2000 redistricting cycle as promoting the “maladies in
American democracy,” which include “an unusually high degree of incumbent safety, a precipitous decline in
competitiveness, growing ideological polarization, and a fierce struggle between the major parties to
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2000 gerrymanders strengthened, the competitiveness of legislative elections
declined to the point that genuinely competitive districts became rare.33 In
2004, for example, only 5 of the 401 incumbents running for reelection to the
House of Representatives were defeated.34 Intertwined with the issue of
competitiveness is the extensive use of sophisticated computer models,35 which
allow state legislators to create district maps incredibly attuned to political,
racial, and socio-economic patterns and interests.36
As partisan
gerrymandering became more pervasive, this technology was crucial in
determining the outcomes of elections.37 Despite considerable public outcry38
and widespread criticism of partisan gerrymandering,39 legal challenges to
partisan gerrymandering have thus far been completely unsuccessful.40
This Part provides an overview of the legal foundations of the political
gerrymandering claim, first tracing the Supreme Court’s development of the
political gerrymandering claim, then discussing the onset of mid-decade
redistricting in the 2000s, which shattered the custom of limiting redistricting
to the beginning of a decade and permitted the advent of pinpoint redistricting.

manipulate the rules of the game to achieve, maintain, or enlarge majority control of the [House of
Representatives]”).
33 See Kang, supra note 4, at 446 (“The proportion of House races decided by competitive margins was
lower in 2002 and 2004 than in any other election years during the postwar period.”).
34 Id.
35 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 343 (“With increasingly sophisticated computer programs to draw
safe districts, there are few contested races for seats in the House of Representatives and many state
legislatures.”).
36 See MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE
ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 104–20 (2001) (describing the astounding
capabilities of computer programs in drawing maps of electoral districts).
37 See David G. Savage, High Court Upholds Texas Redistricting, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A1 (“In
recent decades, computers have given politicians an ever more powerful tool to shape the outcome of elections
by shifting voters among districts.”).
38 See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v.
Carr, in PARTY LINES, supra note 5, at 6, 17 (“Following the 2001 round [of redistricting], political observers
from across the political spectrum . . . denounced the power of district boundaries to predetermine election
outcomes.”).
39 See Christopher J. Roederer, The Noble Business of “Incumbantocracy:” A Response to The Sordid
Business of Democracy, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 373, 389 (2008) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering
“undermine[s] citizen participation and republican self governance”); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 215 (contending
that partisan gerrymandering is “threatening to transform what should be our most dynamically democratic
institution [the House of Representatives] into something sclerotic and skewed”).
40 See infra Parts I.A and I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s political gerrymandering cases).
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A. Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court: Looking at the Big
Picture
Despite the prominent role of political gerrymandering in American
politics, the Supreme Court’s approach to claims of partisan gerrymandering
has doomed any legal challenge’s chance of success. The Court first
recognized the political gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection
Clause in the 1986 decision of Davis v. Bandemer.41 In that case, Indiana’s
Republican-controlled General Assembly passed a redistricting plan following
the 1980 census, which gave their party a significant advantage.42 Democratic
candidates received 51.9% of Indiana’s votes for state house seats in the 1982
elections, but as a result of the redistricting, only 43 Democrats were elected
out of 100 seats.43 Several Indiana Democrats filed suit, claiming that the
Republicans had instituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander that
discriminated against Indiana Democrats as a political group.44
Justice White, writing for the majority, declared that political
gerrymandering claims were justiciable45 over Justice O’Connor’s objection
that political gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question.46 Political
groups, like racial groups, have the right to elect representatives of their
choice, free from unconstitutional discrimination.47 A violation of the Equal
Protection Clause occurs if the group implementing a gerrymander gains
enough of an unfair advantage over the political process.48 However, the Court
ruled that the discrimination against the Indiana Democrats was not
“sufficiently adverse” to declare the Republican partisan gerrymander
unconstitutional.49 Justice White established that a plaintiff must prove “both
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group” to find a political gerrymander
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.50 White noted that it was

41

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Id. at 113.
43 Id. at 115.
44 Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1482 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
45 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119–21.
46 See infra notes 180–183 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence).
47 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124–25 (establishing that claims brought by political groups alleging
unconstitutional discrimination are justiciable).
48 Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 145, 148.
49 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129.
50 Id. at 127.
42
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fairly easy to satisfy the discriminatory intent prong,51 but, as observed by
Mark Rush, “[r]egardless of the motivations of the legislators who drew the
district lines, results are the key component of an unconstitutional
gerrymander.”52 White stated that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only
when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a
whole.”53 White further explained that “such a finding of unconstitutionality
must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a
majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance
to influence the political process.”54
Bandemer thus established a heavy burden for a plaintiff to overcome to
prove discriminatory effect.55 While the Court took the important step of
allowing litigants to bring political gerrymandering claims, the Court’s
standard was so difficult to satisfy that there was, in Professor Samuel
Issacharoff’s words, “virtually no meaningful application.”56 Litigants and
lower courts found Bandemer notoriously difficult to interpret; Issacharoff
wrote that the test “seemed designed to be impossible to apply.”57 Over the
next eighteen years, no federal court, at any level, ruled that a redistricting plan
was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.58 When the Court granted
certiorari to hear Vieth v. Jubelirer, a political gerrymandering claim out of
Pennsylvania during the 2003–2004 term, many critics of the extreme use of
partisanship in redistricting saw the case as an opportunity for the Court to

51 See id. at 129 (“As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove
that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”).
52 MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE?: PARTISAN REPRESENTATION AND
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 4–5 (Lexington Books 2000) (1993) (emphasis in original).
53 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132.
54 Id. at 133.
55 Justice White himself acknowledged that courts and plaintiffs would not have an easy time finding a
political gerrymander to be unconstitutional, noting, “We recognize that our own view may be difficult of
application. Determining when an electoral system has been ‘arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole’ is of necessity a difficult
inquiry.” Id. at 142–43 (citation omitted).
56 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 598 (2002).
57 Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 205, 235 (1995).
58 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (2004) (listing cases dismissing political gerrymandering
claims). The only case that ever actually found an unconstitutional political gerrymander was reversed
because Republican candidates succeeded in districts they claimed were gerrymandered against them five days
after the lower court’s decision. Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, No. 94-2410, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029,
at *13 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (per curiam).
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finally clarify its earlier decision.59 Instead, Vieth nearly marked the death of
the political gerrymandering claim.60
In Vieth, several Pennsylvania Democratic voters filed a lawsuit alleging
that the Republican-dominated state legislature’s heavily partisan 2001
congressional redistricting plan, which resulted in twelve Republicans being
elected to nineteen seats, was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.61
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bandemer, the District Court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the political gerrymandering claim,
and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.62 Justice Scalia, writing for a
plurality of the Court, criticized Bandemer’s creation of a cause of action for
political gerrymandering and declared that “no judicially discernible and
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have
emerged.”63 Basing his decision on the subsequent history of the political
gerrymandering claim and significant criticism of the Court’s leap into the
political thicket, Scalia concluded that Bandemer was wrongly decided and
that political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable.64 Four Justices
dissented, including Justice Stevens, who proposed adapting the Court’s
examination of individual districts in its racial gerrymandering jurisprudence to
political gerrymandering claims.65
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the deciding vote.66 Although
he agreed with the Justice Scalia’s plurality that the Pennsylvania gerrymander
was constitutional, he sided with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Souter on the issue of justiciability, writing, “I would not foreclose all
possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to
correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting

59

See Toobin, supra note 3, at 65 (calling the then-upcoming Vieth decision the “one chance to change
the cycle” of extreme partisan gerrymandering).
60 See Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *44 (N.D. Ga. May 16,
2006) (“Vieth comes close to establishing that political gerrymandering cases are not justiciable.”).
61 Kang, supra note 4, at 448.
62 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272–73.
63 Id. at 281.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Racial gerrymandering is the use of packing and cracking to
distribute minority voters into specific districts. The Court began looking at individual districts that plaintiffs
alleged to be racial gerrymanders in the 1990s. E.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Justice Stevens’s
proposal to take a cue from this approach in terms of partisan gerrymandering is discussed infra Part IV.A.
66 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and
the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C. L. REV. 669, 682–83 (2006).
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cases.”67 While far from an enthusiastic endorsement of striking down partisan
gerrymanders, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence nonetheless kept the political
gerrymandering cause of action alive in the hope that proper judicially
manageable standards for an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander might yet
be discovered.68 Unfortunately, Kennedy did not provide a standard in his
opinion, and the political gerrymandering claim remained mired in
ambiguity.69
B. Shock to the System: The Rise of Mid-Decade Redistricting
The appearance of mid-decade redistricting in the early 2000s brought “a
sudden shock to the ritual of redistricting politics.”70 The traditional custom of
only redistricting at the beginning of a decade upon the release of new census
numbers abruptly changed after the 2002 elections,71 when Republican state
legislators in Texas and Colorado proposed implementing new congressional
redistricting plans that heavily favored Republicans less than two years after
traditional decennial plans had been applied.72 While the Colorado plan was
overturned by the Colorado Supreme Court,73 the fierce political battle over the
more successful Texas gerrymander attracted national attention.74
The Texas Republicans’ mid-decade redistricting, passed in 2003 after
months of partisan jockeying, threats, stalemate, and Democratic legislators
67

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See id. at 309–10 (“It is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process from the attempt to define
standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right is burdened or denied.”); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 138 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that the view on
political gerrymandering claims post-Vieth, as per Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion, is that “when
standards are developed, such cases can be heard”). Interestingly, Justice Kennedy recognized the merits of
the arguments against allowing the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims, even conceding that
“those arguments may prevail in the long run.” Vieth, 541 U.S. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69 See Kang, supra note 4, at 444 (noting that the Court in Vieth “failed again to decide upon a
meaningful standard for such [partisan gerrymandering] claims”).
70 Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2004).
71 See Mann, supra note 5, at 92 (noting that mid-decade redistricting “violated a century-long norm
against undertaking more than one round of redistricting after each decennial census”).
72 Juliet Eilperin, GOP’s New Push on Redistricting; House Gains Are at Stake in Colo., Tex., WASH.
POST, May 9, 2003, at A4.
73 People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1237–40 (Colo. 2003) (finding mid-decade
redistricting unconstitutional under the Colorado Constitution).
74 The Texas re-redistricting was a saga that had its roots in decades of Texas politics, culminating with
the Republican ascendancy in that state in the early 2000s. The story of the redistricting is one of the most
colorful, fascinating, and brutally partisan tales in American political history. For an excellent account of what
happened in Texas, see STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS
AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007).
68
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fleeing the state to prevent a quorum,75 radically changed the complexion of
the state’s congressional delegation. The 2002 elections produced seventeen
Democrats and fifteen Republicans; after the 2004 elections, Texas sent eleven
Democrats and twenty-one Republicans to Washington.76 A federal district
court rejected a legal challenge asserting that the mid-decade redistricting was
an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander,77 and the plaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court. In 2006, the Court held in LULAC that the Republicans’ middecade redistricting was not an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.78
The plaintiffs in LULAC unsuccessfully argued that the Court could finally
formulate a standard for judging political gerrymanders based on the facts of
the Texas mid-decade redistricting. The plaintiffs contended that the fact that
the gerrymander was done mid-decade justified a presumption of invalidity
due to its unusual timing and clearly partisan intent.79 A ban on mid-decade
redistricting would have the advantage of simplicity, allowing a court to avoid
the tricky question of proving discriminatory effect that had plagued the
political gerrymandering claim since Bandemer.80 As Justice Kennedy put it,
the plaintiffs’ proposed solution would “challenge[] the decision to redistrict at
all.”81
Despite a series of facts showing the most outrageous known partisan
gerrymander to date,82 Justice Kennedy declined to use the facts of LULAC as
the basis for a clear standard for an unconstitutional political gerrymander.
Justice Kennedy first rejected the appellants’ proposed standard that middecade gerrymanders with the “sole motivation” of partisanship should be
75

Id. at 141–43.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 412, 413 (2006). While some
increase in Republican representation in Texas’s congressional delegation was perhaps justified, “Texas
Republicans and Democrats privately agree[d] a fair map would produce eighteen Republican and fourteen
Democratic seats.” JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS: HOW PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 104 (2006).
77 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 409.
78 Id. at 423.
79 Id. at 417.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 The League of United Latin American Citizens’ brief included evidence of extreme partisanship in the
redistricting process, including clear statements by Republican leaders indicating the sole partisan intent of the
mid-decade redistricting; Republican leaders abandoning the long-standing traditions of the Texas state
legislature to pass the plan; specific targeting of no less than seven Democratic congressmen for defeat;
shifting over eight million Texas voters into new districts; and creating numerous bizarrely shaped districts
that split up even more counties than the previous plan. Appellant’s Brief on the Merits at 6–10, LULAC, 548
U.S. at 399, No. 05-204; see also supra text accompanying notes 74–76.
76

WHITMAN GALLEYSFINAL

2009]

MINIMIZATION OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING

10/30/2009 3:11:55 PM

223

unconstitutional.83 He then refused to declare that mid-decade redistricting
was presumptively unconstitutional, arguing that, under such a theory, “a
highly effective partisan gerrymander that coincided with decennial
redistricting would receive less scrutiny than a bumbling, yet solely partisan,
mid-decade redistricting.”84 Kennedy further indicated that an outright ban on
mid-decade redistricting could “encourage partisan excess at the outset of the
decade” because a “sole motivation” standard would only apply to mid-decade
redistricting claims.85 Once again, Justice Kennedy declined to set his own
standard based on the facts of LULAC,86 allowing perhaps the most partisan
redistricting plan ever before a court to stand.87
LULAC demonstrated the Court’s reluctance to truly commit to combating
partisan gerrymandering.88 Although presented with an opportunity to
establish a clear standard based on the unique facts of a severely partisan
redistricting that was outside the decennial redistricting cycle, the Court once
again declined to intervene.89 The effect of the Court’s decision was
psychological as well as political; state legislators could conclude that the
courts would not intervene as long as they did not go as far as the Texas middecade redistricting did. The Court’s failure to act prompted “an escalation in
partisan warfare.”90
Several state legislatures redistricted their own
boundaries,91 and Georgia Republicans instituted a mid-decade congressional
redistricting of their own.92 Democrats threatened to retaliate by redistricting
the congressional boundaries of states where they controlled the state

83

LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417–20.
Id. at 419. Kennedy believed that it would be unfair to strike down the 2003 Republican partisan
gerrymander as unconstitutional while preserving the 1991 Democratic gerrymander that had served as the
basis for the traditional decennial plan and was significantly partisan as well. Id.
85 Id. at 420.
86 Id. at 423.
87 See Berman, supra note 10 at 844–45, 848–49 (calling the Texas mid-decade redistricting a “textbook
example” of a gerrymander implemented with “unconstitutionally excessive partisanship”).
88 See Karlan, supra note 10, at 763 (commenting that the Court “remains unwilling or unable” to
intervene on behalf of political groups that allege they have been discriminated against).
89 See Scot Powe & Steve Bickerstaff, Anthony Kennedy’s Blind Quest, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 63, 63 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/powe.pdf (“When far
superior tests [to those rejected by Kennedy in Vieth] were offered in LULAC, he rejected them too.”).
90 See Savage, supra note 36, at A1.
91 Michael P. McDonald, Supreme Court Lets the Politicians Run Wild, ROLL CALL, June 29, 2006, at 4.
92 Tom Baxter & Sonji Jacobs, Legislature ‘05: Senate OKs New Map for Congress; Proposed Districts
Favor GOP; Senate Approves Congressional Map, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 22, 2005, at 1B.
84
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legislature and governor’s office,93 though none of the proposals came to
fruition.94 The reluctance of the Court to make good on Justice White’s
contention that political groups are entitled to protection under the Equal
Protection Clause95 resulted in outrageous levels of partisanship in drawing
district lines, culminating in perhaps the most unique and distinctly partisan
form of political gerrymandering to date: pinpoint redistricting.
II. MINIMIZING THE GERRYMANDER: THE 2006 GEORGIA PINPOINT
REDISTRICTING
Now that the Supreme Court has established that mid-decade redistricting
is not necessarily unconstitutional, political operatives have the ability to
explore more options in the fight for partisan dominance of state legislatures
and congressional delegations. Nathaniel Persily observed that “the recent
Texas re-redistricting has demonstrated[] [that] judicial noninvolvement in this
area has left majority parties with the feeling that they can redraw districts to
their advantage with abandon.”96 Persily’s prediction was most obviously
fulfilled in 2006 when Georgia’s state legislature introduced the political world
to pinpoint redistricting.
Pinpoint redistricting is localized mid-decade redistricting; it is a form of
political gerrymandering that affects only a small number of districts rather
than redrawing the entire map. Pinpoint redistricting adjusts an existing map
in an isolated area to advantage or disadvantage a candidate’s or political
party’s strength in a single district.97 Pinpoint redistricting is reactionary;
drawing upon evidence of past election results, political developments, or
93 See, e.g., EILPERIN, supra note 76, at 107 (noting that the Republicans’ Texas maneuver and efforts in
Colorado and Georgia left Democrats “spoiling for a fight in states like Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, and
New York, where they’ve gained political ground since the start of the decade”).
94 See Charles Babington, Democrats Not Eager to Emulate Texas’s Redistricting, WASH. POST, July 5,
2006, at A7 (observing that, although the LULAC decision presented Democrats with their own opportunity to
redistrict mid-decade, “early indications are that Democrats will probably resist the temptation to do unto
Republicans as Republicans did unto them”). Several well-known Democrats fiercely but unsuccessfully
advocated redrawing districts in their favor, including former Illinois Congressman and current White House
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel. Id.
95 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124–25 (1986).
96 Persily, supra note 7, at 80.
97 The pinpoint redistricting of Georgia State Senate District 46, discussed below, was an example of
targeting a single candidate. See Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” Out of Redistricting:
State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1276 n.150 (2007) (“Three senate
districts in the Athens area were redrawn to fragment Democratic voters after a Democratic representative
announced her candidacy for an open seat.”).
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emerging voter trends, it responds to a party’s weakness in a single district.98
This Part first discusses the Georgia General Assembly’s 2006 pinpoint
redistricting of Georgia State Senate Districts 46, 47, and 49 and 8 of
Georgia’s 180 State House Districts, focusing on the formerly competitive
District 48, and subsequently analyzes the effects of pinpoint redistricting on
the political process and its potential use in the future by partisan state
legislators.
A. Senate Bill 386: Pinpoint Redistricting and Senate District 46
The first challenged instance of pinpoint redistricting was seen in Georgia
prior to the 2006 elections. Georgia’s Senate District 46 was a competitive
district, containing the Democratic stronghold of the city of Athens, Georgia,
home to the University of Georgia.99 The 2004 election in District 46 was
extremely tight; incumbent Republican State Senator Brian Kemp barely
defeated his Democratic opponent, Becky Vaughn, with 51.6% of the vote to
her 48.4%.100 The competitive nature of this district changed, however, in
January 2006 when the Republican-dominated Georgia State Senate passed
Senate Bill 386, which altered the boundaries of Districts 46, 47, and 49101 in
what Georgia’s Democratic Party called a “naked power grab.”102

98 See infra Part II.A (discussing how the Georgia state legislature’s pinpoint redistricting of Senate
District 46 was a reaction to the district’s classification as competitive in the previous election).
99 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *5, *10 (N.D. Ga. May 16,
2006).
100 Id. at *7.
101 Id. at *8.
102 Sonji Jacobs, Legislature 2006: In Brief, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 13, 2006, at D6.
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Figure 1: Georgia Senate Districts 46, 47, and 49 in 2004

Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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Figure 2: Georgia Senate Districts 46, 47, and 49 in 2006

Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government,
Atlanta, Georgia.

Figure 1 shows the Georgia Senate Districts in 2004. District 46 consisted
of a small part of Madison County and all of Oglethorpe, Oconee, and Clarke
Counties.103 District 47 consisted of all of Barrow County, large portions of
Walton, Elbert, and Jackson Counties, and the remaining part of Madison
County.104 District 49 consisted of Hall County and a small part of Jackson
County.105 Figure 2 shows the boundaries after the passage of Senate Bill 386
in 2006. Major changes were made to Districts 46 and 47; most importantly,
the pinpoint redistricting split Clarke County between Districts 46 and 47,106
diluting the strength of the county’s solid Democratic base.107 The only whole
103

See supra fig.1. Clarke County includes the entire city of Athens.
See supra fig.1.
105 See supra fig.1.
106 See supra fig.2.
107 See Brandon Larrabee, Task Force Proposes Commission, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 15, 2006, at 6B
(noting that, before the pinpoint redistricting, “Clarke County was the center of a district that tilted
Democratic”).
104
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county in District 46 is now Oconee County, and the remainder of the District
contains the part of Walton County that was formerly in District 47.108 District
47 now contains the other half of Clarke County and all of Barrow, Madison,
and Oglethorpe Counties and retains the portions of Elberth and Jackson
Counties that were included prior to 2006.109 Minor changes were made to
District 49—mostly miniscule gains of territory around I-85’s route through
Jackson County.110
Senate Bill 386 changed the political complexion of District 46 from
competitive to Republican-leaning.111 The Democratic core of the district in
Clarke County, including Athens and the University of Georgia, was split
directly in half, severely diluting the electoral strength of District 46’s potential
Democratic voters.112
While the Republicans defended the boundary
adjustment as a legitimate move uniting Madison County and increasing
Athens’s representation in the State Senate, it was strongly opposed by
Democrats and advocacy groups, such as Common Cause Georgia, who “felt it
was enacted only for the purpose of increasing the chances of keeping these
three seats in Republican hands.”113 By splitting the Democratic-leaning
Clarke County into two districts, the gerrymander directly harmed Democratic
State Representative Jane Kidd’s bid for the Senate seat, which was being
vacated by the Republican incumbent.114 Kidd, who had defeated the
Republican candidate, Bill Cowsert, in a State House race in 2004 and was
considered a strong candidate for the seat, was reported as the “primary target

108

See supra fig.2.
See supra fig.2.
110 See supra fig.2.
111 See Tom Crawford, Senate Republicans Redraw Three Districts, GA. REP., Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.
ciclt.net/garpt/main.asp?PT=n_detail&Client=garpt&N_ID=400918 (on file with author) (observing that the
redistricting would make “District 46, which is now a competitive district up for grabs between Democrats and
Republicans, a more Republican-leaning district in terms of voter performance in recent elections”).
112 See Larrabee, supra note 107, at 6B (describing Senate Bill 386 as “dividing Clarke County [the center
of a district that tilted Democratic] between two Republican leaning Senate districts”); Jones, supra note 15, at
B5 (summarizing the Democratic view of the bill “as a GOP ploy to place more Republican-leaning voters in
[Districts 46 and 47] by diluting with a split the more liberal area of the University of Georgia-influenced
county of Clarke”).
113 The 2006 Georgia State Senate Races, http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7B8A2D1D15-C65A46D4-8CBB-2073440751B5%7D/The%202006%20Senate%20Races_1.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see
also Brandon Larrabee, Dems, Watchdogs Decry Redistricting, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Feb. 5, 2006, at D3
(“Supporters say the proposal would place all of the less-populous Madison County into one Senate district;
opponents say it is a thinly-veiled attempt to hurt state Rep. Jane Kidd, D-Athens, in her bid to succeed state
Sen. Brian Kemp, an Athens Republican expected to run for agriculture commissioner.”).
114 Jacobs, supra note 102, at D6.
109
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of the map change.”115 Cracking the Democratic stronghold in Clarke County
produced very favorable results for Republicans in the 2006 general election.
Cowsert116 defeated Kidd by a margin of 11.4% (55.7% to 44.3%),117 far
greater than the 3.2% margin of defeat for the Democratic candidate in District
46 in 2004, before the pinpoint redistricting had been implemented.
Kidd filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the pinpoint redistricting
shortly after Senate Bill 386 was passed, alleging an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander, violation of the one-person, one-vote standard, and violation of
the Georgia constitution.118 The three-judge panel that heard the case ruled
against Kidd and upheld the plan instituted by Senate Bill 386,119 but did not
address (and the plaintiff apparently did not argue) the issue of making
individual changes to a districting plan.120 In fact, it seems that the plaintiffs
did not have much faith in the political gerrymandering claim at all; the court
noted that the plaintiffs “[did] not make a distinct political gerrymandering
claim in their complaint” and that the issue was raised only during arguments
before the court.121 While a pinpoint redistricting for partisan advantage took
place, there was never a significant legal battle over its constitutionality, and
no federal appellate court had the opportunity to address the issue.122
115 Tom Baxter, Athens’ New State Senate Lines OK’d, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 21, 2006, at D3; see
also Bill Shipp, Editorial, Assessing Kidd’s Chances for Leading Democrats in Georgia, ATHENS BANNERHERALD, Jan. 3, 2007, at A6 (observing that District 46 was “openly gerrymandered to end Kidd’s political
career”). Mark Monmonier called similar gerrymandering practices that targeted a specific candidate
“cartoassassination.” MONMONIER, supra note 36, at 95.
116 The fact that Cowsert was the Republican candidate suggests a nepotistic motivation for redrawing the
lines. Cowsert had run against Kidd for her State House seat in 2004 and lost by a fairly wide margin—56%
to 44%. Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7 (N.D. Ga. May 16,
2006). Cowsert intended to run against Kidd again for the District 46 State Senate seat in 2006 upon the
retirement of the incumbent, Senator Brian Kemp. Walter C. Jones, GOP Blunders Not Helping Perdue;
Governor Shows Signs of Frustration, FLA. TIMES UNION, Feb. 5, 2006, at B1. Kemp, a supporter of Senate
Bill 386, was Cowsert’s brother-in-law. Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7.
117 Georgia Secretary of State, supra note 21.
118 Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *2, *11.
119 Id. at *59.
120 The plaintiffs apparently focused much of their argument on one-person, one-vote and First
Amendment grounds, as the court noted that the plaintiffs only raised their Equal Protection partisan
gerrymandering claim in oral argument, not in their complaint. Id. at *2. The court did not discuss the issue of
the changes being a pinpointed, isolated redistricting.
121 Id. at *40.
122 The court did address the issue that the redistricting was in the middle of the decade, but based its
decision to dismiss Kidd’s complaint on Georgia’s State Constitution. Id. at *34–*39 (interpreting the Georgia
Constitution as not limiting redistricting to following each census). In a subsequent related proceeding, the
Supreme Court of Georgia came to a similar conclusion. See Blum v. Schrader, 637 S.E.2d 396, 399 (Ga.
2006) (declaring that the frequency of reapportionment is a matter of legislative discretion and that the Georgia
Constitution does not limit the state legislature’s ability to redistrict to once a decade).
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B. House Bill 1137: Pinpoint Redistricting and House District 48
The Georgia House executed a similar pinpoint redistricting of several of
its own districts in 2006. House Bill 1137 adjusted the boundaries of eight of
Georgia’s 180 House districts, leaving the rest of the map intact.123 Democrats
accused the Republican majority of targeting these districts to affect upcoming
elections by strengthening the Republican incumbents in those districts.124
Critics of the bill specifically cited House District 48,125 which provides a good
example of the direct effect of this pinpoint redistricting when comparing the
results of successive elections. Democrat Jan Hackney had lost to incumbent
Republican Representative Harry Geisinger in 2004 by a margin of 53.4% to
46.6%.126 In 2006, widely regarded as a good year for Democrats,127 a rematch
between Hackney and Geisinger under the redrawn district, District 48,
resulted in a victory for Geisinger by a much wider margin of 59.1% to
40.9%.128 The pinpoint redistricting achieved the Republicans’ objective of
securing the seat of a potentially vulnerable Republican incumbent.

123 See H.B. 1137, 152d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (specifically changing House Districts 5, 12,
46, 48, 50, 51, 167, and 179, while leaving all other districts intact); see also infra figs.3 & 4 (documenting the
changes in Districts 46, 48, 50, and 51 in the Atlanta metropolitan area).
124 Sonji Jacobs, Legislature 2006: GOP Denies Self-Serving Remap, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 22, 2006,
at B3.
125 See id. (“Democrats contend that HB 1137 is targeted toward a likely race later this year between Rep.
Harry Geisinger (R-Roswell) and Jan Hackney, a Democrat.”). Compare fig.3 infra (2004 Georgia House
Districts in Atlanta area), with fig.4 infra (2006 Georgia House Districts in Atlanta area).
126 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 2,
2004 General Election, http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2004_1102/120.htm (last visited July
14, 2009).
127 Michael Hill, The Middle-of-the-Roaders Get Their Turn; Political Scientist Says Last Week’s Election
Results Showed the Benefits of Counting on Consensus Instead of Polarization, BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2006, at
1F.
128 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 07,
2006 General Election, http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2006_1107/133.htm (last visited Jul.
14, 2009) (showing election results for State Senate, District 46). . Geisinger himself sponsored the bill that
changed the boundaries of his district. Jacobs, supra note 124, at B3.
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Figure 3: Georgia House Districts 46 and 48 in the Atlanta Area in 2004

Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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Figure 4: Georgia House Districts 46 and 48 in the Atlanta Area in 2006

Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government,
Atlanta, Georgia.

C. Pitfalls and Potential: The Future of Pinpoint Redistricting
Pinpoint redistricting has several negative effects on the democratic
process. As the Supreme Court has recognized, stability is crucial to an
effective democratic system.129 Untimely and isolated changes to district
boundaries disrupt and destabilize established electoral boundaries, causing
disorder among voters and making politicians less accountable to the people
who elected them as certain geographical areas are shifted out of their

129 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964) (noting that “[l]imitations on the frequency of
reapportionment are justified by the need for stability and continuity in the organization of the legislative
system” (emphasis added)). Samuel Issacharoff has more recently written that “a number of Supreme Court
opinions express concern with the stability of the political order.” Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 234.
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districts.130 Changing the boundary lines of isolated districts creates voter
confusion, especially if the changes are increasingly frequent.131 Politicians
become less aware of who their constituents are and attempt to appeal to voters
that will come within the new boundaries in upcoming elections rather than
those they were elected to represent.132
Perhaps most significant, pinpoint redistricting encourages a public
perception that the democratic process is illegitimate or rigged.133 The
manipulation of an individual district with no discernable purpose other than
partisanship decreases voters’ confidence in the relevance of their votes and
the system itself.134 In Georgia, for example, Athens voters affected by
pinpoint redistricting felt manipulated and “helpless” as they made futile
efforts to halt the state legislature’s partisan efforts.135 Pinpoint redistricting
opens the door for politicians to engage in consistent manipulation of their
constituencies, fueling the public’s disillusionment with a system perceived to
be controlled by self-serving politicians.136 As one article notes, “Popular
acquiescence in and support for laws in a democracy . . . depends on the faith
on the part of the losers in this legislative election that they have a fair chance

130 Issacharoff, supra note 56, at 629–30. Political expert Norman J. Ornstein commented on mid-decade
redistricting’s “profound” effect on the voters and the political process: “If you don’t know from election to
election who your representative is, because your district may change, and may change two or three times, it
makes for any sense of accountability in this process being, basically, devastated.” Morning Edition: Supreme
Court Gives States Redistricting Leeway (NPR radio broadcast June 29, 2006), available at http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5520371.
131 See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 97, at 1277 (noting that frequent redistricting could “foster
confusion among voters”). Furthermore, in a case addressing the rights of political parties, the Supreme Court
recognized that “preventing voter confusion” is a legitimate state interest. Tashjian v. Republican Party of
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221–22 (1986).
132 See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1242 (Colo. 2003) (observing that, when district
boundaries are shifted, “a congressperson [will] be torn between effectively representing the current
constituents and currying the favor of future constituents”).
133 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the “unfortunate” validity of this concern in his concurrence to Vieth,
quoting a North Carolina state senator as saying, “We are in the business of rigging elections.” Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134 See J. Gerald Hebert & David G. Vance, Redistricting Must Be Fixed Before Census, ROLL CALL, July
29, 2008, at 4 (observing that excessive gerrymandering “fuel[s] voter apathy”).
135 Brandon Larrabee, Democrats Seek End to Redistricting Fights, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 6, 2006, at
2B. A retired teacher from Athens who accompanied local officials to the state capitol to protest the pinpoint
redistricting said, “We feel like something’s been done to us.” Id.
136 See Powe & Bickerstaff, supra note 89, at 65 (“LULAC opens the door to rolling redistricting and not
only on the Congressional level. . . . Politicians [at any level] will walk through that opening and this will
exacerbate the corrosive cynicism that Americans have acquired believing that politics is rigged by and for the
politicians.”).
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to be the victors in the next.”137 When political actors engage in active and
untimely manipulation of a district’s boundaries between elections, the result is
the loss of that faith through public disillusion and mistrust of the democratic
system.138
Pinpoint redistricting is an especially attractive tactic to politically-minded
legislators because of its subtlety—through pinpoint redistricting, politicians
can accomplish their partisan goals without accountability to an entire state’s
voters.139 A party conducting a statewide mid-decade redistricting will
inevitably face a firestorm of controversy and negative publicity.140 In fact,
fear of a political backlash can cause politicians to hesitate before engaging in
a politically risky statewide mid-decade redistricting.141
Isolating the
gerrymander to a few districts, however, limits the controversy, localizing the
outrage to the affected districts.142 Engaging in pinpoint redistricting allows
politicians to accomplish their political goals through redrawing districts while
avoiding the accountability that accompanies statewide partisan
gerrymanders.143 The use of redistricting software makes this process even
137 Backstrom et al., supra note 48, at 148. The authors continued, “If gerrymandering has unfairly made
much more likely an erstwhile majority’s ten-year control of the legislature, this consensus would be lost, and
the result would be corrosive of the political compact.” Id. That criticism is even more relevant when
considered in the context of consistent manipulation of a district throughout a decade rather than just at its
outset.
138 The use of pinpoint redistricting for political gain is particularly relevant in the context of preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political process. The Supreme Court recognized the
importance of preventing corruption, or the appearance of corruption, in its decisions regarding campaign
finance legislation. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136–37 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976).
139 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan
Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 387 (2005) (“For the ordinary citizen, the shifting of a
few legislative seats is a matter of small consequence.”).
140 See BICKERSTAFF, supra note 74, at 122–23 (describing the almost universal condemnation of the
Texas mid-decade redistricting proposal by the local and national press in 2003); Louis Jacobson, Back to the
Redrawing Board?, 35 NAT’L J. 1173, 1174 (2003) (observing that “voters generally seem to view undertaking
a new round of redistricting [mid-decade] as unseemly”).
141 See Jacobson, supra note 140, at 1174–75 (discussing how widespread criticism makes many
politicians wary of engaging in or publicizing mid-decade redistricting).
142 See Jim Thompson, Editorial, Thompson: Kidd Just Might Have “Right Stuff” for Senate Run, ATHENS
BANNER-HERALD, Mar. 5, 2006, at A8 (reporting that visiting State Senators supporting the pinpoint
redistricting of an Athens district “found . . . a community stirred up about the redistricting. What they didn’t
find was the massive community support which, I’m convinced, [Republican State Senator Ralph] Hudgens
had told them was there for the proposal”).
143 For example, the Georgia redistricting that redrew the statewide congressional districts in 2005 caused
a major uproar in the state, attracting extensive press coverage and public debate. By contrast, the state
legislature’s 2006 pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 attracted barely any attention other than
discontent in the affected districts. Compare Lauren W. Whittington, Perdue Signs New Congressional Map,
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easier; a click of a mouse can show how district lines can be most effectively
manipulated to alter the partisan balance of power.144
Political signals indicate that the use of pinpoint redistricting will grow in
the coming years. In the specific context of Georgia’s pinpoint redistricting,
Professor Michael McDonald suggests that it is likely that other states with
single party control of the state legislature and governor’s office (similar to
Georgia) will attempt isolated redistrictings aimed at single districts or
candidates.145 In response to Republican mid-decade redistrictings of federal
congressional districts in Texas and Georgia, Democrats threatened to retaliate
with pinpoint redistricting in states they controlled, including a proposed
pinpoint redistricting to unseat a vulnerable Republican incumbent in New
Mexico.146 As the likelihood of pinpoint redistricting increases, courts must
adapt the political gerrymandering claim to meet the district-specific
circumstances of this new trend.

ROLL CALL, May 4, 2005, at 11 (discussing widespread discussion and controversy among Georgia political
figures over statewide mid-decade redistricting), with Democrats Protest Athens Redistricting, MACON
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 24, 2006, at 9B (observing political protest over the Georgia pinpoint redistricting among
citizens and politicians of Athens, Georgia). For further discussion of how pinpoint redistricting’s lack of
accountability to a state’s voters undermines the legal rationale for judicial noninterference with partisan
gerrymandering, see infra Part III.B.
144 See Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, NATION, Dec. 29, 2003, at 15, 18 (quoting Howard
Simkowitz, the product manager of a high-tech redistricting software program, as saying, “It’s become a lot
easier to build districts that are lopsided districts, because people can understand the data so much better.
You’re able to really manipulate the data quickly, to try different scenarios, to move the boundaries around and
see what that means.”).
145 Professor McDonald wrote:
Recently, Georgia enacted a new state Senate map that modified the existing state legislativeapproved map. This new map was designed to cripple the election chances of a single Democrat
living in the University of Georgia area. Given how easy it is now to draw maps, this sort of
activity is likely to continue in states with unified government and no prohibition on mid-decade
redistricting.
McDonald, supra note 91, at 4.
146 See Chris Cillizza, Democrats Eye Remap Payback; Leaders Target Illinois, N.M., ROLL CALL, Feb.
22, 2005, at 1 (“[Republican Rep. Heather] Wilson’s Albuquerque-based 1st district is almost evenly divided
along party lines and even the slightest addition of Democrats from Rep. Tom Udall’s (D) northern New
Mexico 3rd district could tilt the balance away from the Republican Member.”).
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III. MODERNIZING THE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIM: WHY PINPOINT
REDISTRICTING REQUIRES COURTS TO RESORT TO A DISTRICT-BASED
APPROACH
Pinpoint redistricting differs greatly from past political gerrymanders
analyzed by the courts. Most importantly, its effects are not statewide, which
distinguishes it from the redistricting plans that the Supreme Court analyzed in
Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC.147 When a political gerrymander centers on a
single district,148 an assessment using the Supreme Court’s statewide approach
is inadequate. This Part first demonstrates that the statewide approach to
political gerrymandering claims is ineffectual when applied to pinpoint
redistricting, and then shows that pinpoint redistricting undermines the
rationale for the judiciary to refrain from taking a strong stance against
political gerrymandering. In its final section, this Part explains that
formulating a new approach in response to pinpoint redistricting will
reinvigorate the political gerrymandering claim and help reestablish its
beneficial deterrent effect. All of these factors demonstrate that pinpoint
redistricting should be addressed in a district-specific context.
A. Why the Statewide Approach Is Inadequate for Pinpoint Redistricting
Throughout its history, courts have approached the political
gerrymandering claim from a statewide perspective, assessing discrimination
against identifiable political groups based on the groups’ standing throughout
the entire state.149
The Supreme Court’s first foray into political
gerrymandering in Bandemer approached the claim in the broadest sense
possible by looking at discrimination from a statewide perspective.150 In
assessing whether the Indiana Republicans’ political gerrymander was
unconstitutional, Justice White specifically cited the statewide percentages of
votes received by Democratic candidates instead of the number of Democratic
candidates elected,151 analyzing the claim in the context of statewide results.152
147

See supra note 18 (noting the statewide scope of the Court’s previous decisions).
See supra Parts II.A and II.B (discussing the Georgia pinpoint redistrictings).
149 See RUSH, supra note 52, at 73 (“Analyses of gerrymandering frequently use a state’s partisan split as
a benchmark for measuring the fairness of a given redistricting scheme.”).
150 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (declaring that “the claim made by the appellees in
this case is a claim that the 1981 apportionment discriminates against Democrats on a statewide basis”
(emphasis added)).
151 See id. at 115 (noting that in the 1982 elections, the Democratic share of the vote for State House seats
was 51.9% of the vote, but only 43 of the 100 elected representatives were Democrats).
152 Id. at 133.
148
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As opposed to looking at discrimination in an “individual district,” the
majority opinion in Bandemer chose to focus on statewide discrimination
against Democrats.153 Even as the Court’s approach to racial gerrymandering
evolved into a district-based analysis over the next two decades,154 the Court
continued to follow the statewide approach in both of its subsequent rulings on
political gerrymandering. Vieth addressed a Republican political gerrymander
by examining the partisan divide in the statewide congressional delegation,155
and Justice Kennedy assessed the degree of partisanship in LULAC in terms of
“statewide party power.”156 Lower courts followed the Supreme Court’s lead
and assessed political gerrymandering in statewide terms.157
Assessing discrimination based on party affiliation through a statewide lens
is essentially fatal to any political gerrymandering claim. Even in states where
one party is dominant,158 the minority party may still garner a significant
percentage of the vote, often elects a strong minority of representatives, and is
active in state politics.159 Because Bandemer indicates that a successful
political gerrymandering claim must show that a political group is “shut out of
the political process as a whole,”160 the mere presence of minority
153 See id. at 127 (declaring that “the appellees’ claim, as we understand it, is that Democratic voters over
the State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional
discrimination”).
154 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the potential use of doctrines developed in racial gerrymandering cases
in future political gerrymandering claims).
155 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 327–28 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the plaintiffs’
statewide claim and emphasizing a more valid district-based claim).
156 League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006).
157 The district court in Vieth, for example, noted:

Although [a political gerrymander] involves, to a certain extent, the manipulation of individual
district lines, the injury is done to the entire identifiable political group. The constitutional injury
lies not in inequality among various individual districts, but rather in the configuration of the
districts as a whole when they serve to disadvantage a certain class of voters.
Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540 (M.D. Pa. 2002). See also Marylanders for Fair
Representation v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1039 (D. Md. 1994) (beginning its analysis of the
discriminatory effects prong of the Bandemer test with emphasis that it concerns “statewide political
gerrymandering” (emphasis added)); Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d mem., 488
U.S. 1024 (1989) (noting that “California Republicans represent so potent a political force that it is
unnecessary for the judiciary to intervene” (emphasis added)).
158 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that in
Hawaii, “one party, the Democratic Party, is predominant”).
159 See Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672 (discussing the extensive influence of the Republican Party in
California despite being the target of a statewide gerrymander).
160 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139–40 (1986) (analogizing the political gerrymandering
inquiry to the Court’s approach to race-based equal protection claims, which requires that the group be “shut
out of the political process”). In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor interpreted the controlling opinion
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representation in government is enough to defeat such a claim.161 As Richard
L. Engstrom observed, “[T]he effects portion of the Bandemer test . . . is
impossible for the supporters of one of the two major parties to meet.”162
Because fellow members of the group claiming that a gerrymander
discriminated against them can be elected elsewhere in the state, Engstrom’s
criticism accurately represents the statewide approach’s ineffectiveness.163
The statewide approach ignores the actual effects of political gerrymanders.
The victims of political gerrymanders are not the marginalized statewide
political parties; these groups will almost certainly be represented in some
capacity at the state capitol or in Washington.164 The real victims are the
marginalized voters in the districts most affected by egregious partisan
gerrymanders. However, courts that assess political gerrymanders from a
statewide perspective allow the rights of those being discriminated against to
be ignored because a statewide group will still receive significant
representation in the legislature.165 Furthermore, political groups are made up
of individuals, and the equal protection claim itself was intended to protect
individual rights.166 Courts taking the statewide approach overlook the rights
of individuals, who experience the effects of the gerrymander in their own

as seemingly “requir[ing] that the political group be ‘essentially . . . shut out of the political process’ before a
constitutional violation will be found.” Id. at 158 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
161 Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672.
162 Richard L. Engstrom, Missing the Target: The Supreme Court, “One Person, One Vote,” and Partisan
Gerrymandering, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 313, 324 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005).
163 Id.
164 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115–16 (noting that Democrats maintained substantial statewide political
power); League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006) (justifying the
2003 Texas gerrymander “as making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power,” despite
significantly decreasing the number of Democrats in the Texas congressional delegation).
165 One California district court demonstrated the significance of a party’s statewide power in political
gerrymandering claims:
Chief among our observations is our undisputed knowledge that California Republicans still hold
40% of the congressional seats, a sizeable bloc that is far more than mere token
representation. . . . We also note that California has a Republican governor, and one of its two
senators is a Republican. Given also that a recent former Republican governor of California has
for seven years been President of the United States, we see the fulcrum of political power to be
such as to belie any attempt of plaintiffs to claim that they are bereft of the ability to exercise
potent power in “the political process as a whole” because of the paralysis of an unfair
gerrymander.
Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672.
166 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (“It is the individual who is entitled
to the equal protection of the laws . . . .”).
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individual districts.167 Therefore, a statewide perspective to judging political
gerrymanders ignores the true victims of the partisan gerrymander because
assessing a party’s statewide strength says nothing about whether an individual
district was gerrymandered.168
The established political gerrymandering claim is even less effective at
properly assessing a gerrymandering plan’s harms when the gerrymander is a
pinpoint redistricting. When the actual effects of a gerrymander are limited to
a small portion of the state, assessing the representational harms by looking at
statewide figures is misguided and irrelevant. Georgia’s pinpoint redistricting
shows the disconnect between the current approach of assessing the effects of
partisan gerrymanders on political groups and individuals who are actually
harmed. The interests of Georgia’s Democratic voters, a political group that
encompasses all of the party’s voters or affiliated members throughout the
state, were only marginally affected by Senate Bill 386 because they continued
to be represented by twenty-two out of Georgia’s fifty-six state senators after
the 2006 elections.169 In reality, the pinpoint redistricting discriminated
against a smaller group consisting of Democratic voters within District 46.170
This particular group, which came within less than 2,000 votes of victory in
2004,171 was genuinely affected by the legislature’s manipulation of their
district to harm the Democratic candidate’s prospects in the upcoming
election.172 Under Bandemer and its progeny, the pinpoint redistricting of
District 46 would not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; the
Democrats were not “shut out of the political process”173 because the party as a
whole maintained some representation statewide.174 On a local level, however,
the Democrats of the affected districts were “shut out” of the political
process—the pinpoint redistricting destroyed the strong chance they had of

167

See supra notes 135, 142 (discussing the effects of pinpoint redistricting on voters in an individual
district).
168 See Issacharoff, supra note 56, at 603–04 (observing that “a broad-level measure of statewide support
provides little specific information about whether any particular district was gerrymandered”).
169 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 07,
2006 General Election http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2006_1107/swgasenate.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2009).
170 See Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7–*8 (N.D. Ga. May
16, 2006) (explaining that the gerrymander’s effect was limited to three Senate districts).
171 Id. at *7.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 111–17 (discussing the effects of the Georgia pinpoint
redistricting).
173 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132, 139 (1986).
174 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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being represented in at least one of the altered districts.175 Courts need to
address pinpoint redistricting by looking at the effects on the district-specific
group of party-affiliated voters, rather than allowing their claim to be
overshadowed by that party’s statewide voters, who suffered a comparatively
marginal injury.176
The unique circumstances of pinpoint redistricting not only permit but
require a different analysis than the statewide approach pursued by the
Supreme Court in Bandemer and its progeny. When the Court allowed the
Indiana gerrymander in Bandemer, the Court noted, “Statewide . . . the inquiry
centers on the voters’ direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state
legislature as a whole.”177 The Georgia State Senate’s pinpoint redistricting,
however, only affected elections to the state legislature in three districts.178
Where the discrimination is suffered by voters in individual districts, but there
is almost no statewide effect, the logic of the statewide political
gerrymandering approach simply does not apply. Under a claim based on
Bandemer, changes to a small group of districts would most likely be irrelevant
because of the state-wide strength of the political party.179 Pinpoint
redistricting must therefore be distinguished from previous political
gerrymandering claims and analyzed under a standard that recognizes its
unique qualities.
B. The End of Self-Correction
In her concurrence to the Bandemer decision, Justice O’Connor argued that
political gerrymandering claims should be declared nonjusticiable and that
such matters belong in the domain of state legislatures.180 Outlining one of the

175 See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. Republican candidates were victorious in all three
of the districts affected by the pinpoint redistricting. Georgia Secretary of State, supra note 169.
176 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
177 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added).
178 Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *8.
179 See supra note 165 (noting the weight a district court gave to a political party’s statewide strength).
180 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would hold that the partisan
gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary
should leave to the legislative branch as the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended.”). Justice
O’Connor brought a unique perspective to the Court’s evaluation of political gerrymandering. Prior to her
appointment to the Court by President Reagan in 1981, Justice O’Connor was a Republican state senator in her
home state of Arizona. At the time of the Bandemer decision, she was the only member of the Court to have
served in one of the “political branches” and was intimately familiar with the partisan nature of business in a
state legislature. For a fascinating account of Justice O’Connor’s politics, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE:
INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 141–44 (2007).
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most compelling reasons for judicial non-interference with political
gerrymandering, Justice O’Connor expressed her view that political
gerrymandering was a “self-limiting enterprise.”181 She believed that the
negative effects of a political gerrymander could be effectively remedied
through avenues other than a constitutional challenge, particularly the political
process itself.182 Justice O’Connor explained the potential for a political
gerrymander to be self-defeating:
In order to gerrymander, the legislative majority must weaken some
of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to greater risks of
defeat . . . . Similarly, an overambitious gerrymander can lead to
disaster for the legislative majority: because it has created more seats
in which it hopes to win relatively narrow victories, the same swing
in overall voting strength will tend to cost the legislative majority
183
more and more seats as the gerrymander becomes more ambitious.

In the context of decennial statewide redistricting, there is merit to Justice
O’Connor’s theory of self-correction.184
Statewide gerrymanders are
vulnerable to being overcome by three factors: (1) potential political backlash
against the redistricting party; (2) the likelihood of the gerrymander
overextending itself; and (3) the probability that the gerrymander can be
overcome over the course of the decade. All three of these realities act as
checks on partisan gerrymandering by weakening their effectiveness and
sustainability. Pinpoint redistricting, however, undermines all three of these
principles that support Justice O’Connor’s theory.
1. Political Backlash and Accountability
Political backlash, whether actual or potential, acts as perhaps the most
important check on partisan gerrymandering by ensuring the redistricting

181

Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See id. (“There is no proof before us that political gerrymandering is an evil that cannot be checked or
cured by the people or by the parties themselves.”).
183 Id. (citations omitted). For a prophetic example that demonstrated the accuracy of Justice O’Connor’s
analysis, see infra note 184.
184 Justice O’Connor’s view was vindicated by an egregious case of partisan overstretch in Georgia after
the 2000 census, where a Democratic gerrymander actually led to the defeat of prominent Democratic backers
of the plan and a Republican majority in the State Senate in the first election after its implementation in 2002.
Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L. J. 21, 29 (2004).
This gerrymander was the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461
(2003). Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Ashcroft; appropriately, the results of the gerrymander
in the 2002 elections supported her faith in self-correction.
182
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party’s accountability to their constituents.185 Public reactions to decennial
statewide partisan gerrymandering, especially mid-decade redistricting, are
almost universally negative. The mid-decade congressional redistrictings in
Texas in 2003 and, to a lesser extent, Georgia in 2005 attracted national
attention, were almost universally condemned in the press, and met ridicule
and disapproval from the voting public.186 Furthermore, while some partisan
actors feel that the benefit of securing advantages for their party through middecade redistricting outweighs the cost of bad publicity,187 the fear of political
backlash causes many politicians to restrain their impulses to engage in such
politically risky behavior.188 The potential political price of retaliating for
Republican mid-decade redistricting efforts discouraged many Democratic
politicians in other states from moving forward with mid-decade redistrictings
of their own.189 Accountability to the voting public thus acts as a deterrent to
gerrymandering.
Pinpoint redistricting, however, destroys any significant political
accountability to the voters because it minimizes the political backlash.
Because the gerrymander is limited to a small part of the state, it is unlikely
that there will be a widespread negative reaction to the legislature’s
manipulations.
Pinpoint redistricting therefore gives politicians the
opportunity to achieve partisan goals through gerrymandering without
hesitating at the possibility of a public relations nightmare. In Georgia, the
pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 attracted barely any attention
outside of Athens (especially compared to the statewide mid-decade
redistricting of the previous year),190 and the Republicans accomplished their

185 See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 256 (2006)
(noting the urgent need to protect “the electoral accountability of officeholders to voters” in light of LULAC).
186 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line: Will Tom DeLay’s Redistricting in Texas Cost Him His
Seat?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 32, 37 (quoting Samuel Issacharoff as saying that the common
perception of the Texas mid-decade redistricting is that it was a “national scandal”); see also supra text
accompanying notes 140, 143 (discussing the political backlash against the Texas and Georgia mid-decade
congressional redistrictings).
187 See BICKERSTAFF, supra note 74, at 126–27 (discussing Republican attempts to promote a mid-decade
redistricting plan in Texas despite statewide “negative PR”).
188 See Jacobson, supra note 140, at 1175 (“Despite being pressured a bit by national party leaders, many
state lawmakers seem to be taking the bad press that new redistricting proposals are generating as a warning—
even in cases where their own party could benefit from a new map.”)
189 See Babington, supra note 94, at A7 (noting some Democratic politicians’ unwillingness to engage in
mid-decade redistricting in retaliation of Republican efforts in Texas and Georgia for fear of stoking
controversy and voter outrage).
190 See supra note 143.
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goal of securing a vulnerable seat.191 By eliminating any substantial political
risk and accountability, the subtlety of pinpoint redistricting makes it even
more harmful than mid-decade partisan gerrymanders conducted statewide.
2. Overextension
As Justice O’Connor explained, a redistricting party can fall victim to
overextension when it spreads out friendly partisan voters over too many
districts to maximize its advantage.192 While the redistricting party may be
aiming for political advantage through such a gerrymander, districts drawn
with only a slim majority of friendly voters can backfire as the opposing
party’s voters are able to overcome these tenuous majorities.193 A party’s own
ambition can therefore lead to its demise.194
Pinpoint redistricting can eliminate this weakness of partisan
gerrymandering. There is little risk of overextension because the scope of the
gerrymander is so small. For example, the two state senate districts mainly
affected by the Georgia pinpoint redistricting previously consisted of the
competitive District 46 and the solidly Republican District 47.195 The pinpoint
redistricting turned both of these districts into secure Republican seats without
risking either one; the Republican voters brought into the formerly competitive
District 46 came from a district where the Republican candidate won over 70%
of the vote in 2004.196 Rather than distributing friendly voters throughout the
state, Republican state legislators were able to pick their battlefield and shift
the boundaries in an area where there was no risk of overextension.
3. The Element of Time
Justice O’Connor’s insistence that gerrymandering is “self-correcting”197
also depends upon the element of time. While a decennial statewide
191

See supra text accompanying notes 111–117.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
193 See Lublin & McDonald, supra note 2, at 155 (“The failure of the Georgia Democrats, who had won
legislative majorities with a minority of votes in several elections during the 1990s, to hold on to their majority
in 2002 despite aggressive efforts to protect it through redistricting seemingly confirms [Justice O’Connor’s]
assertion [that partisan gerrymanders are ‘self-limiting’].”).
194 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
195 See supra notes 99–102, 111–17 and accompanying text.
196 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006).
In 2006, Republican candidates won the races in Districts 46 and 47 by double-digit margins. Georgia
Secretary of State, supra note 169.
197 See supra text accompanying note 181.
192
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redistricting can give a major advantage to the redistricting party, the variable
of time, encompassing shifts in political fortunes, ensured that the system
could not be permanently rigged.198 Over the course of a decade in an
unchanged system, control of the electoral process shifts from the powerful
parties to the people as the effects of the initial partisan gerrymander gradually
erode through population shifts and political trends.199 Adam Cox has called
this “beneficial uncertainty.”200 Arguing for limiting redistricting to once a
decade, Cox observes that redistricting multiple times in a decade allows state
legislators to consistently adapt a state’s district boundaries to prevent the
effects of variations in voters’ preferences.201
Legislators can do everything in their power to manipulate district lines
most favorably to their party at the start of a decade, but their power to control
voters over time is limited for several reasons. First, politics is unpredictable.
A party that has been suppressed throughout the state or a veteran politician in
a supposedly secure district can face a sudden turn in fortune and be swept in
or out of power by events no one could have predicted when the district lines
were drawn.202 This happened on a national scale in 2006; many believed that
congressional districts were so heavily gerrymandered in favor of Republicans
that even a tidal wave of Democratic support could not give the Democrats a
majority.203 Instead, Democrats scored victories in many traditionally
conservative or Republican districts.204
Second, shifts in political,
geographical, or socioeconomic factors can overcome a political gerrymander

198 Cf. Michael J. Kasper, The Almost Rise and Not Quite Fall of the Political Gerrymander, 27 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 409, 424–25 (2007) (arguing that the mood of the voting public can overcome gerrymandering).
199 Cox, supra note 70, at 772; see also Levitt & McDonald, supra note 97, at 1276 (“Natural population
shifts over the course of a decade inject a degree of uncertainty into the broad calculations of those who draw
the lines, and generally moderate the effects of an initial redistricting.”).
200 Cox, supra note 70, at 769.
201 Id. at 770.
202 For example, Republican Congressman Mark Foley represented a gerrymandered district in South
Florida that was considered securely Republican with a very conservative bent. Nonetheless, a high-profile
scandal forced his resignation in 2006, and one of the more conservative districts in Florida went to a
Democrat in that year’s election. Josh Kraushaar, GOP Sees Shot at Regaining Foley’s Former Seat,
POLITICO, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0207/2954.html.
203 See Klain, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that, after LULAC, “any remaining hope that enough
congressional races would be competitive in 2006 to change the balance of power in the House seemed all but
extinguished”); McDonald, supra note 91 (noting that extreme partisan gerrymandering “has contributed to a
reduction in electoral competition to the point where we are wondering if the Democrats will win the 15 seats
they need to gain majority control [in] the House, despite President Bush’s approval rating dropping to the
30s”).
204 Klain, supra note 1, at 75–76.
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drawn to conditions that existed at the time the map was drawn.205 Even an
initially successful gerrymander can result in a majority for the opposition
party several years after it is implemented.206 This “beneficial uncertainty”207
gradually allows the voting population to overcome the manipulative actions of
their representatives.
The advent of pinpoint redistricting, however, eliminates unpredictability.
Legislators can now halt “self-correcting” trends against partisan gerrymanders
by identifying threats to their parties’ candidates or incumbents in districts that
are showing signs of becoming more competitive and conducting the political
equivalent of a surgical strike. They can shift the lines of an isolated group of
districts to eliminate the threat of meaningful competition.208 Since legislators
can change the lines at any time and in any part of the state that they want,
self-correction can be stopped in its tracks because elections are no longer
unpredictable. Pinpoint redistricting therefore makes Justice O’Connor’s
theory of self-correction obsolete.209 Political players can undermine any
natural self-correction by manipulating voters’ emerging chances to elect new
representatives.210 The emergence of pinpoint redistricting has dealt a fatal
blow to the logic of Justice O’Connor’s theory that political gerrymandering is
a “self-limiting enterprise.”211
C. Reestablishing the Bandemer Stopgap
The rise of mid-decade redistricting, coupled with the Supreme Court’s
acquiescence, allows partisan-minded legislators to redraw district lines to the
205 See Cox, supra note 70, at 771–72 (discussing the role of shifts in parties’ political fortunes,
geographic factors, voting trends, and other influences in eroding the effects of a partisan gerrymander).
206 See, e.g., Frank Jossi, Blood Sport: Redistricting Promises to Be Difficult Again as Lawmakers Await
2010 Census, SAINT PAUL LEGAL LEDGER CAPITOL REP., Dec. 8, 2008, at 3 (“[T]he myth that a plan to
gerrymander the state could create a one-party rule doesn’t work, at least not in Minnesota. The [DemocraticFarmer-Labor] plan in the 1990s led to a Republican-led house in 1996 and lasted a decade. The 2000 plan,
created by a panel of judges led by a Republican, resulted in a dominant [Democratic-Farmer-Labor] house by
2006.”).
207 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
208 E.g., Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7–*8 (N.D. Ga. May
16, 2006).
209 See Pildes, supra note 185, at 275 (observing that “[m]id-decade redistricting destroys [the] inherent,
structural check” of gerrymandering being a self-limiting enterprise); see also Cox, supra note 70, at 776
(noting that “self-limitation is much weaker where the parties are free to redistrict frequently”).
210 See Cox, supra note 70, at 775 (noting that a ban on mid-decade redistricting “will prevent parties in
control of the redistricting process from frequently adjusting district boundaries to shore up their control in
districts where their margin of victory has eroded or is otherwise dangerously slim”).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 181–183.
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smallest detail with virtually no fear of recrimination from federal courts.212
The Supreme Court’s most recent cases regarding political gerrymandering
make pinpoint redistricting a much more attractive option because the Court
stubbornly continues to look at political gerrymanders through a statewide
lens. The LULAC decision in particular opened the floodgates for legislators to
redistrict at will213 and practically destroyed the deterrent effect that previously
prevented partisan gerrymanders from going too far.
Bandemer held that an unconstitutional political gerrymander could be
found only when a gerrymander arranged the electoral system “in a manner
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
political process as a whole.”214 This high threshold established what some
have called an “unmanageable standard” for finding a political gerrymander to
be unconstitutional.215 While Bandemer’s standard imposed a heavy burden
for political gerrymandering plaintiffs, its ambiguity forced partisan-minded
legislators to be cautious; at any point, the Court could have declared a
particularly zealous partisan gerrymander unconstitutional.216 Professor
Richard Hasen interpreted the Bandemer decision’s tack as an effective
strategic move: by allowing political gerrymandering claims to be justiciable
with an extremely high standard, Hasen argued, Bandemer “serves as a
backstop (and perhaps as a deterrent) to police the most egregious forms of
partisan gerrymandering.”217 In essence, the threat of judicial intervention can
be just as effective as intervention itself.218
In his 2005 assessment of the state of the political gerrymandering claim,
Nathaniel Persily suggested that redistricters defending their plan “should
beware of [arguing that their plan was based upon partisanship rather than
race] because in a nearby thicket lies the Supreme Court, perhaps with a new
rule against partisan gerrymandering that will force them back to the drawing
board.”219 However, any deterrent effect produced by the fear of judicial
212

See supra text accompanying note 96.
See BICKERSTAFF, supra note 74, at 387 (“[T]he door has been opened by the Supreme Court for middecade redistricting by state and local governments nationwide.”).
214 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986).
215 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V.
CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 70 (2003).
216 See infra text accompanying note 219 (quoting Persily, supra note 7, at 89).
217 HASEN, supra note 215, at 71. Maintaining this “unmanageable standard” with the option to intervene
as a deterrent to political gerrymandering may have been Justice Kennedy’s motive for maintaining the
justiciability of political gerrymandering claims in Vieth and LULAC.
218 Id.
219 Persily, supra note 7, at 89.
213
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intervention ended with LULAC, when the Court allowed the most egregious
partisan gerrymander on record.220 The fear of judicial intervention, which
served as a deterrent to particularly excessive partisan gerrymanders,221
essentially no longer exists.222 As Michael Kasper ominously put it, “after
LULAC, the political gerrymandering claim is dead in all but name.”223
Pinpoint redistricting presents courts with an opportunity to breathe life
back into the political gerrymandering claim by shifting from a statewide to a
district-based approach. Because the effects of pinpoint redistricting are
limited to a small number of isolated districts, courts would have to discard
much of the rationale underlying past gerrymandering claims and formulate a
new approach focusing on harms produced by partisan gerrymanders in
districts rather than entire states. This would restore the stopgap that
Bandemer established, Vieth maintained, and LULAC destroyed. The potential
for judicial intervention can be revived as an important check on overzealous
legislators hoping to redistrict the opposing party into powerlessness.224 By
creating and applying a district-based standard to instances of pinpoint
redistricting, the value of the political gerrymandering claim would gain a
firmer foundation and again force state legislators to act cautiously when
redrawing the lines.
IV. ESTABLISHING A DISTRICT-BASED STANDARD
The advent of pinpoint redistricting presents an opportunity to depart from
the statewide view of political gerrymandering claims and formulate a new
district-based approach, which could evolve into a broader application to all
instances of political gerrymandering. This Comment, reacting to pinpoint
redistricting, proposes incorporating and adapting the Supreme Court’s
gerrymandering jurisprudence to formulate a new and effective district-based
standard: a severe political gerrymander, identifiable by the extremely unusual
nature of its implementation, would be unconstitutional if partisan intent
220

See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying note 217 (noting the “deterrent” effect of Bandemer).
222 See supra text accompanying note 96 (observing that majority parties in state legislatures feel that they
can “redraw districts to their advantage with abandon” in light of the Texas mid-decade redistricting).
223 Kasper, supra note 198, at 423. In its current state, the political gerrymandering claim is largely seen
as a lost cause. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 343 (observing that after Vieth and LULAC, “it is hard
to imagine any successful challenge when the political party controlling a legislature draws districts to
maximize its safe seats”).
224 See supra text accompanying note 219.
221
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guided every major aspect of drawing the new district lines and the
gerrymander resulted in “active degradation” of a political group’s electoral
strength in a specific district through substantial weakening of the group’s
political performance in successive elections. Although this new standard is
tailored to address the problem of pinpoint redistricting, it can serve as a model
for future statewide political gerrymandering claims.
This Part first discusses how the Shaw line of cases can be integrated into
the realm of political gerrymandering, as suggested by Justice Stevens in his
dissent to Vieth, and uses the unusual circumstances of pinpoint redistricting to
create a potential district-based standard for detecting unconstitutional
gerrymanders. The next section proposes adapting the Bandemer standard to
account for the unique nature of pinpoint redistricting and incorporating its
assessment of the effects of a gerrymander into this new standard. The third
section looks at the views of Justice Kennedy, the most crucial vote on the
current Court, and concludes that the specific circumstances of pinpoint
redistricting could satisfy his requirements for an appropriate standard. The
final section integrates these sources into a district-based standard that would
effectively address pinpoint redistricting and could serve as the basis for a
more effective universal political gerrymandering standard.
A. “Circumstantial Bizarreness”: Adapting Racial Gerrymandering
Jurisprudence
The most promising and appropriate source to draw from in formulating a
district-based political gerrymandering standard is the Supreme Court’s racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence, which now looks at individual districts rather
than statewide plans. Unlike its relatively weak approach to political
gerrymandering, the Supreme Court has acted much more aggressively against
attempts to pack and crack minority voters through racial gerrymandering.225
State legislators, especially in states with a history of discrimination, had long
engaged in redistricting practices clearly aimed at diluting the strength of or
outright excluding minority voters.226 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well
as its subsequent amendments and judicial interpretations, require that minority
225

Courts can better identify the harms of racial gerrymandering because racial groups are far more easily
defined than political groups, and this has translated to a stronger and clearer limitation on racial
gerrymandering. RUSH, supra note 52, at 5–6.
226 See Gomillon v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (striking down an “uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure” in a new districting plan obviously drawn to exclude black voters from a district in Tuskegee,
Alabama).
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voters in these states be given the opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice,227 which led to a number of oddly shaped districts spanning large
swaths of territory, gathering dispersed minority voters into a district where
they could constitute a majority.228 In the 1990s, in a line of cases emanating
from Shaw v. Reno,229 the Supreme Court began addressing bizarrely shaped
individual districts that litigants claimed were unconstitutionally based on
racial factors.230 The Court developed a district-based standard to apply to
these claims, declaring that race could not be the “predominant factor” in
drawing the boundaries of the district.231 For a district to be unconstitutional,
all other factors must have been subordinated to race.232
The claims raised in the Shaw cases arose from obvious indications of
racial gerrymandering through the shapes of challenged districts. In Shaw, the
Court recognized a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause when the
redistricting legislation was “so extremely irregular on its face” that it could
only be viewed as gerrymandering voters on the basis of race.233 The
irregularity that prompted the Court’s recognition of a potential equal
protection violation was the extremely unusual or “bizarre” shape of the
district.234 In essence, the appearance of a district was an indicator or warning
sign of discrimination.
In his dissent in Vieth, Justice Stevens wished to align the Court’s approach
to political gerrymandering with its progress in the arena of racial
gerrymandering by adapting the Shaw line of cases’ district-based standard to
political gerrymandering cases.235 Stevens proposed that a state legislature has
227

DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING,

AND

REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 72–73 (1999).
228 Engstrom, supra note 27, at 11.
229

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Id.; accord Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
231 Easley, 532 U.S. at 241.
232 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. Ironically, these gerrymandering claims were directed against districts that
were drawn to provide an advantage to minorities who had been discriminated against in the past. Engstrom,
supra note 27, at 59.
233 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
234 Id. at 644.
235 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 327 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “racial and
political gerrymanders are species of the same constitutional concern”). Two of the other dissenters, Justices
Souter and Breyer, also proposed standards to govern political gerrymandering claims. Justice Souter
advocated a five-part test that the plaintiffs would have to meet with regard to individual districts, including
violations of “traditional districting principles,” drawing a more acceptable hypothetical district, and
demonstrating intent to pack or crack the plaintiff’s political group. Id. at 347–51 (Souter, J., dissenting).
230
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a “fundamental duty to govern impartially”236 and argued that political
affiliation should not be used to exclude voters from districts.237 Stevens’s
Shaw-based proposal for a standard would invalidate a political gerrymander if
“the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the
lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.”238
Expanding upon Justice Stevens’s proposal, the Shaw line of cases’
methods of indicating potentially unconstitutional use of race could be adapted
to craft an effective and manageable standard to detect a potentially
unconstitutional political gerrymander. As the Court noted in Shaw, the
redrawing of district lines is “one area in which appearances do matter.”239
The appearances that matter in pinpoint redistricting would not be the
appearance of the district itself, but the circumstances under which it was
drawn. The discriminatory intent wing of a district-based standard would
consist of a circumstantial analog to the Shaw cases’ rejection of “bizarre”
district shapes.240
To find that unconstitutional political gerrymandering occurred, a
predominant motivation of partisanship would have to be combined with
extremely unusual circumstances directed toward accomplishing that partisan
goal. This would be an analog to the “extreme irregularity” of a district shape
in a Shaw claim.241 Those unusual conditions would be the circumstances of a
pinpoint redistricting: a political gerrymander in the middle of a decade with
the limited effect of changing the boundaries of an isolated district or group of
districts. This “circumstantial bizarreness” would apply to the Georgia state
legislature’s unique pinpoint redistricting, which contained three irregular
characteristics: (1) it was done mid-decade, (2) it was isolated to three districts
rather than the whole state, and (3) the city of Athens, Georgia, known to be a
Democratic stronghold, was suddenly split down the middle.242 These bizarre
characteristics are indicators of a strong discriminatory intent for partisan
Justice Breyer proposed overturning a partisan gerrymander resulting in “unjustified entrenchment,” in which
a political minority is only in power because of the partisan manipulation and no other factors. Id. at 360–62
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). However, unlike Justice Stevens’s proposal, neither suggestion
draws upon the Court’s tested racial gerrymandering jurisprudence. Both proposals therefore fail to utilize the
most effective source for developing a district-based standard.
236 Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 325.
238 Id. at 339.
239 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
240 Id. at 644.
241 Id. at 642.
242 See supra Part II.A (describing the circumstances and effects of Senate Bill 386).
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purposes, and present the circumstances naturally leading into the inquiry of
discriminatory effect.
B. “Active Degradation”: Modifying Bandemer
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the discriminatory effect of a
partisan gerrymander is the key to finding it unconstitutional. As Professor
Mark Rush put it, “A partisan-gerrymander claim . . . requires a showing that
the representational opportunity of partisan voters has been denied or impaired
as a result of the redrawing of district lines.”243 While the aforementioned
adaptation of Shaw would assist in detecting the circumstances of an
unconstitutional political gerrymander under this proposed standard,244
Bandemer, which remains relevant to any analysis of the political
gerrymandering claim,245 provides the only existing guidance from the Court
on what evidence could prove discriminatory effect.246 Justice White declared
that a political gerrymander is not unconstitutional “unless the redistricting
does in fact disadvantage it at the polls.”247 Any evidence that would meet
Justice White’s standard must show “consistent” degradation of a political
group’s ability to influence the political process;248 courts and scholars have
interpreted this language as saying that a successful political gerrymandering
claim must analyze the results of multiple elections.249
More than any other factual scenario adjudicated in the past, pinpoint
redistricting can meet the requirements of “consistent degradation.” In the
context of pinpoint redistricting, plaintiffs can show a clear difference in
election results in a particular district before and after its alteration, meeting
Justice White’s evidentiary threshold requiring the results of multiple

243

RUSH, supra note 52, at 6.
See supra Part IV.A.
245 See Lowenstein, supra note 139, at 394 (arguing that, after Vieth, “Bandemer is still binding
precedent”).
246 See Charles S. Bullock III, Redistricting: Racial and Partisan Considerations, in LAW AND ELECTION
POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 151, 168 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2005) (noting that one of the major
unsolved issues in the law of political gerrymandering is “what evidence would suffice to win a claim alleging
a partisan gerrymander”).
247 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986).
248 Id. at 132.
249 As Erwin Chemerinsky noted, “[Bandemer] was clear that a single election is not sufficient.”
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 889. See also Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 396 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (“We
note that in Bandemer the plurality held that the results of a single election were insufficient to establish
discriminatory effect.”).
244
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elections.250 However, pinpoint redistricting goes even further than a
decennial political gerrymander because it actively degrades a political group’s
ability to influence the process in a single district by building further partisan
advantage upon a plan that already benefits the majority party.251 In addition
to its more focused partisan nature, a political gerrymandering claim based on
pinpoint redistricting can much more effectively show this active form of
“consistent degradation” by comparing district-specific election results in
successive elections.
A new standard tailored to the circumstances of pinpoint redistricting
should therefore reveal what this Comment terms “active degradation” of a
political group’s standing in a single district. The results of successive
elections in districts affected by pinpoint redistricting would satisfy the Court’s
long-established desire to examine the effects of a partisan gerrymander to
determine its unconstitutionality.252
Furthermore, this modification of
Bandemer provides a clearer evidentiary foundation than a pure adaptation of
Shaw to the political gerrymandering claim. Justice Stevens proposed adapting
to political gerrymandering claims the Shaw line of cases’ idea of preventing
“representational harms,” which defined the harm of a gerrymander as
constituents being represented by an officeholder who felt beholden to those
who drew the lines.253 This rationale is relevant to pinpoint redistricting, as a
representative whose district is altered may, as Stevens feared, feel beholden to
the party that redrew the lines solely to benefit his own candidacy.254
However, because pinpoint redistricting affects isolated districts, looking at
results in those districts’ successive elections gives courts tangible evidence of
discriminatory effect. Therefore, a standard focusing on evidence of “active
degradation” would be much more manageable.
The Georgia examples provide an excellent demonstration of “active
degradation” of a political group’s influence in specific districts. The election
250

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 889.
E.g., Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7–*8 (N.D. Ga. May
16, 2006).
252 E.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139.
253 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The . . . danger of a partisan
gerrymander is that the representative will perceive that the people who put her in power are those who drew
the map rather than those who cast ballots, and she will feel beholden not to a subset of her constituency, but to
no part of her constituency at all.”).
254 See id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Gerrymanders subvert [the] representative norm [of legislators
being elected by voters] because the winner of an election in a gerrymandered district inevitably will infer that
her success is primarily attributable to the architect of the district rather than to a constituency defined by
neutral principles.”).
251
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results in Senate District 46 before and after Senate Bill 386 altered its
boundaries show that the Democratic candidate’s margin of loss increased
from 3.2% under the original boundary lines in 2004 to 11.4% under the
altered district boundaries in 2006, clearly indicating that the pinpoint
redistricting disadvantaged the Democrats of that district at the polls.255 The
effects of House Bill 1137 provide an even stronger showing of “active
degradation” because the results in one of the changed districts, House District
48, involved the same two candidates both before and after the pinpoint
redistricting.256 In both 2004 and 2006, Republican Harry Geisinger defeated
Democrat Jan Hackney, but the margin of victory changed from a relatively
close 6.8% in 2004 to a decisive 18.2% in 2006.257 This concrete evidence,
combined with the knowledge that the districts were adjusted between
elections, is a compelling demonstration of the discriminatory effect of a
political gerrymander through results of multiple elections.258 A court
presented with this evidence could certainly see not just consistent but active
degradation of Democratic voters’ ability to influence the political process.259
C. The Swing Vote: Convincing Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy sits at the center of a Supreme Court divided on political
gerrymandering. The four dissenters in Vieth and LULAC supported taking
some kind of stand to police political gerrymanders,260 while the plurality in
Vieth, followed by Justices Scalia and Thomas in LULAC, argued that political
gerrymandering is not justiciable at all.261 Justice Kennedy has effectively
255 See supra text accompanying note 117 (noting the comparison of the margins of defeat for Democratic
candidates in Senate District 46 in the 2004 and 2006 elections).
256 Supra text accompanying notes 126–128.
257 Georgia Secretary of State, supra note 128.
258 As Adam Cox has observed, “continuing losses across several election cycles simply help confirm that
the partisan gerrymander, and not other potential causal factors, is responsible for the voter losses observed in
the first period.” Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 379 (2007).
259 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132, 133 (1986).
260 The four dissenters in Vieth and LULAC, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, would almost
certainly have backed any manageable standard that would provide a meaningful check on partisan
gerrymandering. Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (In All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L. J. 626, 627 (2004).
261 Interestingly, the two most recent appointees to the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
sidestepped the justiciability issue in LULAC. League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548
U.S. 399, 492 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (“The question of whether [any reliable
standard for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders] exists—that is, whether a challenge to a
political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy—has not been argued in these cases. I
therefore take no position on that question . . . .”). This implies that the justiciability of the political
gerrymandering claim may be more secure than it was after Vieth; of the current composition on the Court,
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straddled the fence: he sided with the dissenters on the justiciability of political
gerrymandering claims, but wrote the controlling opinion that upheld both
recent plans to go before the Court.262 While he has never voted to strike down
a partisan gerrymander, it was his crucial vote that kept the claim alive in both
Vieth and LULAC.263 Any political gerrymandering claim that goes before the
Court must, above all else, convince Justice Kennedy.264
Justice Kennedy has indicated that he is open to the possibility of
establishing a judicially manageable standard for adjudicating political
gerrymandering claims “within narrowly circumscribed situations.”265 Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in LULAC shows that he is looking for something more
than mid-decade redistricting, even if its predominant goal is gaining partisan
advantage.266 However, he cryptically hinted in LULAC at what would satisfy
his personal, as-yet-unknown standard: “The legislature does seem to have
decided to redistrict with the sole purpose of achieving a Republican
congressional majority, but partisan aims did not guide every line it drew.”267
Statewide redistricting plans inevitably take numerous factors into account,
such as geography, satisfying the Voting Rights Act, and incumbent
protection.268 It would be almost impossible to satisfy Justice Kennedy’s
desired standard of totally partisan objectives when analyzing a statewide plan.
Pinpoint redistricting, however, with its limited scope, motives, and objectives,
might meet Justice Kennedy’s proposed scenario for an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander. Pinpoint redistricting is focused solely on a small
number of districts; there are far fewer considerations in drawing the lines than

only Justices Scalia and Thomas have explicitly argued that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.
Kasper, supra note 198, at 423.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 66–69, 83–87 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s role in the Vieth and
LULAC decisions).
263 See supra Parts I.A and I.B.
264 See generally John Gibeaut, All over the Map: Politics and Law Mix as High Court Weighs Jumping
into Gerrymandering Flap, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2006, at 18, 18–19 (discussing the importance of Justice Kennedy’s
role as the deciding vote in political gerrymandering cases).
265 Roederer, supra note 39, at 389.
266 See text accompanying notes 83–85 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s rationale in declining to strike
down the Texas mid-decade redistricting).
267 League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417 (2006) (emphasis added).
268 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 963–64 (1996) (discussing various factors used in drawing district
boundaries, including incumbency protection, urban centers of districts, racial considerations, and political
groupings); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417–18 (noting that “mundane and local interests” guided the
drawing of some district boundaries).
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there are in statewide redistricting.269 It is therefore much easier to determine
that the few lines redrawn in a pinpoint redistricting were solely backed by
partisan aims.
Justice Kennedy has also emphasized that clear proof of discriminatory
partisan effect is key to his approval of an unconstitutional political
gerrymandering standard.270 As the previous section demonstrates, pinpoint
redistricting provides clearer, more focused evidence of discriminatory effect
than previous statewide claims by comparing before-and-after election results
in a district affected by the pinpoint redistricting.271 For the first time,
plaintiffs can demonstrate clear evidence of the effects of a partisan
gerrymander through successive election results in a single altered district,
uninfluenced by election results throughout the rest of the state.272 This
demonstration can provide Justice Kennedy with his much-desired evidence of
discriminatory effect.
D. The District-Based Standard
A judicially manageable standard that would effectively address pinpoint
redistricting should incorporate and adapt elements of all of the
aforementioned sources: racial gerrymandering jurisprudence and Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Vieth, the Bandemer standard, and Justice Kennedy’s
elusive concept of unconstitutional political gerrymandering. This districtbased standard would effectively address pinpoint redistricting and would have
a strong focus on both discriminatory intent and effect. Under this standard, a
severe political gerrymander, identifiable by the extremely unusual
circumstances of its implementation, would be unconstitutional if partisan
intent guided every major aspect of drawing the new district lines and resulted
in active degradation of a political group’s electoral strength in a specific
district evidenced by substantial weakening of the group’s political
performance in successive elections.
This standard is specifically tailored to the factual circumstances of
pinpoint redistricting, which can much more easily meet these elements than a
269 See Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *8 (N.D. Ga. May 16,
2006) (discussing how the changes implemented by Senate Bill 386 were limited to affected three districts).
270 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418 (“We should be skeptical . . . of a claim that seeks to invalidate a statute
based on a legislature’s unlawful motive but does so without reference to the content of the legislation
enacted.”).
271 See supra Part IV.B.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 252–257.
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statewide redistricting plan. The Georgia examples of pinpoint redistricting
would be unconstitutional political gerrymanders under this standard. The
Georgia state legislature’s minor changes to Senate District 46 and House
District 48 were clearly guided by partisanship; in fact, specific partisan aims
motivated the lines it drew.273 Specifically, the newly drawn lines of Senate
District 46 fragmented the core Democratic constituency in Athens and the
University of Georgia that formerly made up the base of Democratic support in
that district274 and severely degraded the Democratic voters of that district’s
ability to elect their candidate.275 The effects prong is also satisfied in both of
these situations, demonstrated by the results of successive elections in the
affected districts. The margin of victory for the Republican candidate over the
Democratic candidate in both Senate District 46 and House District 48
increased from highly competitive margins in 2004 to near-landslide margins
in 2006.276 These election results clearly show active degradation of
Democratic voters’ electoral potential in the targeted districts because the
pinpoint redistricting directly and substantially decreased their chances for
success.
CONCLUSION
Pinpoint redistricting presents an opportunity for courts to shift the
paradigm of political gerrymandering claims from a statewide perspective to a
more appropriate district-based assessment. In his concurrence to the Vieth
decision, Justice Kennedy refused to consign the political gerrymandering
claim to the graveyard, hoping that some “limited and precise rationale” would
someday arise to provide a basis for a clear standard.277 The unique
circumstances of pinpoint redistricting finally present that precise rationale for
the judiciary to bring the political gerrymandering claim out of the wilderness
and develop a workable standard that would provide clearer guidance to courts
and litigants. The limited scope of pinpoint redistricting would force courts to
consider the impact of gerrymandering in the individual affected districts.
273 See supra Part II.A (discussing the motives of Senate Bill 386 to “crack” a Democratic stronghold and
hurt a Democrat’s bid for the District 46 seat); see also Jones, supra note 116, at B1 (discussing how the
pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 was perceived as a political ploy to help a politically connected
Republican candidate win a competitive election).
274 See supra note 112.
275 See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 97, at 1276 n.150 (noting the Georgia pinpoint redistricting’s goal
of “fragment[ing]” Democratic voters to harm a Democratic candidate’s chances of success).
276 See supra text accompanying notes 117, 128.
277 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Pinpoint redistricting emphasizes the fact that the true harms of
gerrymandering lie in individual districts and the individuals that reside in
those districts rather than entire states, and courts can apply that assessment to
individual districts affected in more conventional statewide gerrymanders.
Therefore, while this proposed approach is aimed at addressing pinpoint
redistricting, it can provide a stepping stone for an effective, judicially
manageable district-based standard for all future political gerrymandering
claims, focusing on the instances in which gerrymandering does the most
damage.
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